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Abstract
We present our works on SemEval-2021 Task
5 about Toxic Spans Detection. This task aims
to build a model for identifying toxic words in
whole posts. We use the BiLSTM-CRF model
combining with ToxicBERT Classification to
train the detection model for identifying toxic
words in posts. Our model achieves 62.23% by
F1-score on the Toxic Spans Detection task.
1 Introduction
Detecting toxic posts on social network sites is a
crucial task for social media moderators in order
to keep a clean and friendly space for online dis-
cussion. To identify whether a comment or post
is toxic or not, social network administrators often
read the whole comment or post. However, with a
large number of lengthy posts, the administrators
need assistance to locate toxic words in each post to
decide whether a post is toxic or non-toxic instead
of reading the whole post. The SemEval-2021 Task
5 (Pavlopoulos et al., 2021) provides a valuable
dataset called Toxic Spans Detection dataset in or-
der to train the model for detecting toxic words in
lengthy posts.
Based on the dataset from the shared task, we
implement the machine learning model for detect-
ing toxic words posts. Our model includes: the
BiLSTM-CRF model (Lample et al., 2016) for de-
tecting the toxic spans in the post, and the Toxi-
cBERT (Hanu and Unitary team, 2020) for classify-
ing whether the post is toxic or not. Before training
the model, we pre-process texts in posts and encode
them by the GloVe word embedding (Pennington
et al., 2014). Our model achieves 62.23% on the
test set provided by the task organizers.
2 Related works
Many corpora are constructed for toxic speech de-
tection problems. They consist of flat label and
hierarchical label datasets. The flat label datasets
only classify one label for each comment in the
dataset (e.g., hate, offensive, clean), while hierar-
chical datasets can classify multiple aspects of the
comment (e.g., hate about racism, hate about sexual
oriented, hate about religion, and hate about dis-
ability). For flat label, we present several datasets
including the two datasets which are provided
by Waseem and Hovy (2016) and Davidson et
al. (2017) in English, the dataset of Albadi et al.
(2018) in Arabic, and the dataset of by Alfina et
al. (2017) in Indonesian. For the hierarchical label,
we introduce the dataset constructed by Zampieri
et al. (2019) in English, the dataset provided by
Fortuna et al. (2019) in Portuguese, and the CO-
NAN dataset by Chung et al. (2019), which is the
multilingual corpus (constructed in Italian, English,
and French).
In addition, many of shared tasks about hate
speech and abusive languages are organized, such
as the SemEval-2019 Task 5 (Multilingual) (Basile
et al., 2019), the SemEval-2019 Task 6 (English)
(Zampieri et al., 2019), the PolEval 2019 Shared
task 6 (Polish) (Ptaszynski et al., 2019), the Ger-
mEval 2018 (Germany) (Wiegand et al., 2018),
EVALITA 2019 (Italian) (Bosco et al., 2018), Toxic
Comment Classification Challenge1, and VLSP
2019 Shared task (Vietnamese) (Vu et al., 2019).
Besides, SOTA approaches like deep learning
(Badjatiya et al., 2017) and transformers models
(Isaksen and Gambäck, 2020) are applied in the
hate speech detection and toxic posts classification.
However, these models only classify based on the
whole posts or documents. For the Toxic Spans
Detection task, we adapt the mechanism from Se-
quence tagging (Wang et al., 2020) and Name en-
tities Recognition (Lin et al., 2017) for detecting

























The dataset is provided from the SemEval-2021
Task 5: Toxic Spans Detection (Pavlopoulos et al.,
2021). It includes the training and the test sets.
Both of them consist of two parts: the content of
posts and the spans denoting the toxic words in the
posts. Spans represent toxic words in the posts as a
set of character indexes. Table 1 illustrates several
examples from the training set.






















































Figure 1: Number of toxic words in spans for each post
in the training set.






































Figure 2: Number of toxic words in spans for each post
in the test set.
According to Table 1, a post contains multiple
spans of toxic words. For each span, it contains a
single word, a phrase, or a sentence. As described
in Figure 1, most of the spans in the training set
are single words, which account for 67.65%, while
only 20.06% of spans contains two words, and
6.1% of spans is empty. Posts whose spans contain
more than two words in the dataset are few. Espe-
cially in the training set, there is a post in which
spans contain 25 words.
Besides, Figure 2 illustrates the number of toxic
words in spans per post for the test set. Spans
containing single words account for the highest
percentage (70.35%) in the test set, and are higher
than in the training set, while the multiple-word
spans are few. Also, the empty spans in the test
set are higher than the training set, and the longest
post in the test set contains only seven words.
4 System description
4.1 Data preparation
With the given dataset from the SemEval-2021
Task 5 about Toxic Spans Detection (Pavlopoulos
et al., 2021), we firstly transform spans into a set of
words. Then, we pre-process the posts as follows:
(1) Segmenting the posts by the TweetTokenizer
from nltk2, and (2) Changing texts to lower case.
4.2 Feature extraction
We use the glove.twitter.27b.25d word embedding3
to construct the dictionary and encode the text of
posts. Posts are encoded by the dictionary of the
word embedding. The < UNK > tokens are
added if a word in posts is not found in the dic-
tionary. To make sure all vectors are the same
length, we add the < PAD > token. Then, we
set the maximum length of vectors equal to 128.
Spans are transformed into a one-hot vector corre-
sponding to each word in posts where toxic words
are denoted as 1 and others are denoted as 0. Table
2 illustrates an example of encoding data in our
system.
4.3 Training models
Detection model: BiLSTM-CRF is a deep neu-
ral model used for Named-entity recognition task
(Lample et al., 2016). We implement this model
for the task of detecting toxic words in documents.
The model includes three main layers: (1) The
word representation layer uses embedding matrix
from the GloVe word embedding, (2) The BiLSTM
layer for sequence labeling, and (3) The Condi-
tional Random Field (CRF) layer to control the
probability of output labels. The output is a binary






1 What a knucklehead. How can anyone not know
this would be offensive??
[7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]
2 I only use the word haole when stupidity and arro-
gance is involved and not all the time. Excluding the
POTUS of course.
[31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 45,
46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53]
3 Such garbage logic by republicans which will
backfire and rush america into the great depression II
[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]
4 what a hypocrite of bs,, tell us loser how you live
without gasoline, plastic, medical needs and medica-
tions, all from OIL,, but you cant of course so you
ignorant fools in your hypocrisy spew this bs
[7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 155, 156,
157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 178, 179,
180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186]
5 Exposing hypocrites like Trump and Pence is thera-
peutic for you? Good job!
[]
Table 1: Sample posts from the training set. The toxic span are highlighted as bold.
Original Transformed
Text I only use the word haole when stupidity and
arrogance is involved and not all the time. Ex-
cluding the POTUS of course.
[’i’, ’only’, ’use’, ’the’, ’word’, ’haole’, ..]
Vector: [12, 216, 718, 15, 894,..]
Spans [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 45, 46, 47, 48,
49, 50, 51, 52, 53]
[’i’, ’only’, ’use’, ’the’, ’word’, ’haole’,
’when’, ’stupidity’, ’and’, ’arrogance’,
’is’, ...]
Vector: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0 ...]
Table 2: Example of encoding data into vectors.
a word is toxic or non-toxic. The architecture of
BiLSTM-CRF is described in Figure 3.
Classification model: The ToxicBERT model
(Detoxify) is introduced by Hanu and Unitary team
(2020) with the purpose to stop online abusive com-
ments. It is a pre-trained model and is easy to
use by using transformers library4. The model is
trained on the Toxic Comments Classification Chal-
lenge datasets provided by Jigsaw.
Our system combines the detection and clas-
sification model together. The detection model
(BiLSTM-CRF) returns the toxic spans from the
post, while the classification model (ToxicBERT)
classifies whether a post is toxic or non-toxic. If a
post is non-toxic, the classification model returns
an empty span. By contrast, it reserves the spans
of the detection model. Then, predicted spans are
decoded to character indexes for submission. Our
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Figure 4: Our system architecture.
5 Experimental results
5.1 Evaluation metric
The variant version of F1-score is used to evaluate
the results of the competition (Da San Martino
et al., 2019). Let T is the total of post in the dataset,
T = [t1, t2, ..., tn], n is the number of posts, A is
spans given by the model, and G is ground truth
spans.









In the Equation 1, P t determines the precision,
and Rt determines the recall of the post t. The pre-
cision and recall are calculated as Equation 2 and
Equation 3, respectively. The St in both Equation










5.2 Main result from task
Model Result (%)
BiLSTM-CRF 61.32
BiLSTM-CRF + ToxicBERT 62.23
Top 1 rank 70.83
Table 3: Experimental results obtained by our system
in comparison with Top 1 rank result.
According to Table 3, when only BiLSTM-CRF
is used, the result by F1 score is 61.32%. The
result increases up to 62.23% when we applied
ToxicBERT Classifier, and this is our final result of
the shared task (ranked 63th among 92 teams).
5.3 Error analysis
According to Table 4, the appearance of the Toxi-
cBERT classifier can make a better prediction for
the non-toxic posts (See example No. 1). This
increases the performance of our system, however,
not significantly, because the number of empty
toxic span comments in the test set is not too much
(as described in Section 3). Apart from empty
spans, wrong predictions are fell into the case as
example No.3. Although the ToxicBERT model
predicts this example as non-toxic, the BiLSTM-
CRF model predicts it as empty spans, and thus
the result is empty spans according to the result of
the BiLSTM-CRF model. For example No.2, the
system returns wrong spans for the first span in the
post. Finally, our system cannot predict well for
spans that contain more than two words. It returns
spans, but not enough, as shown in examples No.4
and No.5 from Table 4.
6 Conclusion
We use the BiLSTM-CRF and ToxicBERT models
for detecting toxic words in the posts. Our model
achieves 62.23% by F1-score from the competition.
From the error analysis, we found that our model
predicts well just for single-word spans and empty
spans.
In further researches, we improve the perfor-
mance of the detection model by applying the at-
tention mechanism and using the character-level
representation combining with word-level represen-
tation. Character-level models like CharBERT (Ma
et al., 2020) is a potential approach to increase the
performance of toxic spans detection tasks.




1 Indeed, people the
world over, all know
that President Trump
is a loser!
[] [66, 67, 68, 69, 70] []
2 Idiot ”miner” in
the photo isn’t even
wearing a dust mask.
MSHA needs to in-
spect this operation
for more worker safety
violations.
[0, 1, 2, 3, 4] [-1, 0, 1, 2, 3] [-1, 0, 1, 2, 3]
3 People who are anti-
immigration are weak,
lying, racist whiners.
[49, 50, 51, 52, 53,
54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59,
60, 61, 62]
[] []




etc. You’ll wish your
body had only some
crap rather than gang-
banger gunfire.
[38, 39, 40, 41, 42,
43]
[38, 39, 40, 41, 42,
43, 133, 134, 135,
136]
[38, 39, 40, 41, 42,
43, 133, 134, 135,
136]
5 What is he going to do
about those toxic mer-
cury florescent bulbs
Bush and Gore pushed
on the stupid American
public?
[94, 95, 96, 97, 98,
99, 100, 101, 102,
103, 104, 105, 106,
107, 108, 109, 110,
111, 112, 113, 114,
115]
[94, 95, 96, 97, 98,
99]
[94, 95, 96, 97, 98,
99]
Table 4: Several wrong predictions on the test set by our system.
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